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Chapter 3
Age-Based Retirement Incentives
for Tenured Faculty Members:
Satisfying the Legal Requirements
David L. Raish

Many colleges and universities have begun experiencing fewer retirements
among their oldest tenured faculty members. Some of these institutions
are exploring, or have instituted, age-based retirement incentive programs
under which greater beneﬁts are available on earlier retirement. These programs help institutions to achieve a more orderly turnover of faculty and, in
many cases, substantial cost savings. At the same time, the programs oﬀer
individual faculty members the opportunity to retire more comfortably at
an earlier age, if they choose to do so.
Until recently, the legality of these age-based retirement incentive programs was unclear. In addition, court challenges had become increasingly
common under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended (ADEA). However, in October 1998, Congress enacted a ‘‘safe harbor’’ exception 1 to the ADEA covering certain age-based retirement incentive beneﬁts oﬀered by institutions of higher education to their tenured faculty members.
A variety of retirement incentives for tenured faculty, age-based or not,
are now permitted under the ADEA. However, careful planning is required
to satisfy the conditions of the ADEA as well as other federal and state laws.
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Assessing the Need for Retirement Incentives
Not surprisingly, expiration at the end of 1993 of the ADEA’s special exception permitting mandatory retirement in higher education has led to fewer
retirements by tenured faculty members, especially among those nearing,
at, or over age 70.2 Experience will, of course, inevitably vary from one institution to another, depending on a number of factors, including the climate
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of the institution (meteorological and otherwise), the teaching and other
demands placed on senior faculty, the level of retirement income provided
by the institution’s retirement plans, the availability of postretirement health
coverage, and the extent to which retirement or other beneﬁt plans may
provide disincentives to retire.3
Those institutions that experience fewer retirements among tenured professors of retirement age will generally face increased budget pressures,
given the salary diﬀerential that typically exists between long-term and
entry-level faculty members. This was recognized in the January 1998 report
of the National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education. The report
recommended legislation to permit age-based retirement incentives for tenured faculty members as one means of checking the skyrocketing costs of
a college education (National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education 1998). Institutions also typically need to encourage more retirements
in order to respond to changing academic needs, including necessary hires
in new and existing ﬁelds (National Research Council 1991: 3).4
In 1986, Congress commissioned a study from the National Academy of
Sciences on the impact on major research institutions of the expiration
of the special ADEA exception permitting mandatory retirement of tenured faculty at age 70. The Committee on Mandatory Retirement in Higher
Education, formed to conduct the study, concluded in its 1991 report that
the mandatory age 70 retirement provision should be allowed to expire
(National Research Council 1991: 5). However, it reached this conclusion
on the assumption that age-based voluntary retirement incentive plans were
available to institutions of higher education, in order to encourage retirements in the normal course (National Research Council 1991: 3). Contrary to this expectation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and others have, in recent years, challenged the legality of some
age-based faculty retirement incentives, and some of these challenges have
met with success in the courts.5
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The ADEA in General
With certain exceptions, the ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to ‘‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.’’ More
speciﬁcally, the ADEA also prohibits an employer from ceasing or reducing,
because of age, contributions under a deﬁned contribution retirement plan
or beneﬁt accruals under a deﬁned beneﬁt retirement plan.
The ADEA’s deﬁnition of ‘‘employer’’ speciﬁcally includes ‘‘a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or
a political subdivision of a State.’’ Further, the ADEA also incorporates by
reference provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act which allow for pri-
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vate causes of action against federal and state governments. However, the
Supreme Court has recently held that the ADEA’s purported abrogation of
the states’ sovereign immunity is unconstitutional, and, therefore, private
claims cannot be brought in federal court against state employees, including state colleges and universities.6 The Court’s decision, however, appears
to leave open the possibility of enforcement action by EEOC.

Retirement Incentives Available Before the New Safe Harbor
Some retirement incentives were permissible under the ADEA prior to enactment of the safe harbor for tenured faculty in 1998. These incentives
remain available. Indeed, Congress expressly provided that the 1998 safe
harbor does not aﬀect the application of the ADEA to plans or employers
outside the safe harbor.7
Plans without beneﬁts that decline with age. If a retirement incentive arrangement does not reduce or eliminate beneﬁts on account of increased age, it
does not run afoul of the ADEA prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of age. Having a minimum age for a given beneﬁt does not violate the
ADEA, even if that minimum age is greater than 40. In other words, younger
members of the class protected by the ADEA—those age 40 or older—may
be denied a beneﬁt that is available to older members of the protected class.8
For example, it would be permissible for an institution to oﬀer lifetime
medical coverage to faculty members or other employees retiring at or after
a stated age, such as age 60. Similarly, it would be permissible for an institution to oﬀer faculty members over a stated age, such as age 62, the ability
to make a reduced time commitment for a stated period, give up tenure,
and receive disproportionately greater compensation during that period. A
phased retirement plan might, for example, permit a faculty member over
age 62 to work half-time for up to three years for 75 percent of full-time pay,
provided the faculty member gives up tenure at the beginning of the phased
retirement period and agrees to retire altogether at the end of that period.
The most common type of retirement incentive arrangement with no reduction or cessation of beneﬁts based on increased age is a ‘‘window’’ plan.
Under such a plan, enhanced retirement beneﬁts are oﬀered only if an individual retires during a speciﬁed period of months. For example, an institution might establish a ‘‘window’’ plan under which faculty members over a
stated age, such as 60 or 65, may elect, between September 1 and December 31 of a given year, to retire on June 30 of the following year and receive
certain enhanced beneﬁts. The enhanced beneﬁts might include a lump
sum cash payment, a larger pension under a deﬁned beneﬁt plan, postretirement health coverage (or, if that coverage is already available, a greater
employer contribution toward that coverage), and perhaps other beneﬁts
or perquisites. Those who do not elect retirement during the 4-month win-
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dow receive no such enhancements on retirement. Because of the incentive
provided by the closing of the window on December 31, faculty members are
encouraged to retire now rather than later. No upper age limit or age-based
reduction is needed to provide such an incentive.
Window plans do, however, have several drawbacks. First, they are often
perceived by faculty members as unfair, since they require a decision within
a limited period of time during which the faculty member may be unable or
unwilling to think seriously about retirement. They also deny the beneﬁt enhancements to those who may choose to retire a year or two later. While well
suited for an immediate reduction in force (and, therefore, widely used by
other employers for this purpose), window plans are inconsistent with the
longer term, orderly turnover of faculty that most institutions and their faculty members prefer. If an institution were to reopen the window and oﬀer
enhanced beneﬁts again, the incentive would quickly become diluted, as
some faculty members would put oﬀ retirement and wait for the next opening of the window.
Incentives in deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans. The ADEA permits certain agebased early retirement subsidies in deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans.9 First, an
employer may oﬀer social security supplements that provide extra beneﬁts
only to those retiring before a speciﬁed age at which social security beneﬁts
are available (so-called ‘‘social security bridge beneﬁts’’). A deﬁned beneﬁt
plan might provide, for example, that individuals retiring between ages 60
and 65 will receive an increase in their monthly retirement beneﬁt equal to
the social security beneﬁt they can expect to receive at age 65, if they wait
until age 65 to apply for their social security beneﬁt. This eliminates one
disincentive to retirement before age 65—that of having no social security
income available between ages 60 and 62 and only a reduced Social Security
income available for life if the beneﬁt is started between ages 62 and 65.
Other early retirement subsidies are also permitted by the ADEA. For example, a participant who has accrued an annual lifetime beneﬁt under a
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan, starting at age 65, equal to $30,000, might
receive only about $15,000 per year if the participant retires and starts the
beneﬁt at age 55. This results from the normal actuarial reduction based on
the fact that payments will be made for a longer period of time. The plan
may enhance that early retirement beneﬁt, so that the participant receives
the same annual amount upon retirement at age 55 (or age 60) as he or she
would have received if the beneﬁts had started at age 65.
Voluntary early retirement incentive plans consistent with the purposes of the ADEA.
The ADEA also permits voluntary early retirement incentive plans (VERIPs)
consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of the ADEA.10 The relevant purposes of the ADEA are to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and to help employers and workers ﬁnd ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.11

6140 Clark / TO RETIRE OR NOT / sheet 51 of 186

Age-Based Incentives for Tenured Faculty Members

43

The scope of the ADEA exception for VERIPs is unclear. It has no meaning if it does not permit at least some retirement incentive plans under
which beneﬁts are reduced or cease as a result of increased age. As discussed
above, minimum age requirements are permissible under the ADEA, and a
plan that involves no reduction or cessation of beneﬁts based on increased
age is already consistent with the ADEA.
The Statement of Managers on the Older Workers Beneﬁt Protection Act
of 1990 (OWBPA), which added the VERIP exception to the ADEA, cryptically explains:
Early retirement incentive plans that withhold beneﬁts to older workers above a speciﬁc age while continuing to make them available to younger workers may conﬂict
with the purpose of prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employment.12 (emphasis added)

This language suggests that some age-based retirement incentive arrangements are permitted by the VERIP exception. However, it also suggests that
some are not, and it is unclear where the line should be drawn.
In a 1992 request for comments on certain issues to be addressed in future
regulations, the EEOC asked:
Does OWBPA allow the reduction or elimination of an early retirement beneﬁt in
correlation with increasing age or increasing years of service? If so, under what circumstances? 13

Not long thereafter, in a diﬀerent administration, the EEOC answered its
own question, taking the position that the VERIP exception permits no voluntary early retirement incentive plan that involves a reduction or cessation
of beneﬁts based on increased age.14 In a 1997 decision of a federal magistrate judge, that position met with success.15 However, in a 1998 decision of a
U.S. Court of Appeals, the VERIP exception was held to apply to a plan that
provided special beneﬁts upon retirement only in the ﬁrst year in which the
teacher had both attained age 55 and completed twenty years of service.16
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The Safe Harbor for Certain Age-Based Faculty
Retirement Incentives
The uncertain scope of the VERIP exception, together with the limited usefulness of the retirement incentives otherwise available under the ADEA,
prompted the higher education community to seek legislative clariﬁcation
that voluntary retirement incentive plans, under which beneﬁts end or decline in value based on increased age, could be oﬀered to tenured faculty
members. The result was the enactment of a safe harbor for certain agebased plans as part of the Higher Education Amendments of 1998.17
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Overview of the safe harbor. The safe harbor permits supplemental beneﬁts
that are reduced or eliminated based upon age, subject to six conditions:18
First, the employer must be an institution of higher education.
Second, the beneﬁts must be oﬀered to employees with unlimited tenure.
Third, the beneﬁts must be payable upon voluntary retirement.
Fourth, the institution must not implement any age-based reduction or
cessation of beneﬁts other than these supplemental beneﬁts (except as
otherwise permitted by the ADEA).
Fifth, the supplemental beneﬁts must be in addition to any retirement or
severance beneﬁts that have been available to tenured faculty members generally, independent of any early retirement or exit-incentive plan, within the
preceding 365 days.
Sixth, any tenured faculty member who attains the minimum age and satisﬁes all non-age-based conditions for receiving such a supplemental beneﬁt
must have an opportunity for at least 180 days to elect to retire and receive
the maximum supplemental beneﬁt that could then be elected by a younger
but otherwise similarly situated employee. The faculty member must also
have the ability to delay retirement for at least 180 days after making that
election.
Institutions of higher education. The safe harbor is limited to plans oﬀered
by institutions of higher education as deﬁned in Section 101 of the Higher
Education Act of 1965, as amended. That deﬁnition generally includes any
educational institution that:
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• admits as regular students only persons having a certiﬁcate of graduation
from a school providing secondary education, or the recognized equivalent of such a certiﬁcate;
• is legally authorized to provide a program of education beyond secondary education;
• provides an educational program for which the institution awards a
bachelor’s degree or provides not less than a two-year program that is
acceptable for full credit toward such a degree;
• is a public or other nonproﬁt institution; and
• is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association, or if not so accredited, is an institution that has been granted preaccreditation status by such an agency or association that has been recognized by the secretary for the granting of preaccreditation status, and
the secretary has determined that there is satisfactory assurance that the
institution will meet the accreditation standards of such an agency or association within a reasonable time.
This deﬁnition is essentially the same as the deﬁnition of ‘‘institution of
higher education’’ in the ADEA provision which, prior to January 1, 1994,
permitted mandatory retirement of tenured faculty members at age 70.
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Employees with unlimited tenure.The safe harbor is limited to beneﬁts oﬀered
to employees serving under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure). This language is identical to
the corresponding language of the ADEA provision which, prior to January 1, 1994, permitted mandatory retirement of tenured faculty at age 70.
The Conference Committee Report on the Higher Education Amendments
of 1998 (the Conference Report) 19 conﬁrms that the language is intended
to have the same meaning as it did in that context.20
The Conference Report makes clear that a faculty member need not be
tenured at the time beneﬁts are actually provided, so long as he or she was
tenured at the time the beneﬁts were oﬀered. Take, for example, a phased
retirement program under which faculty members give up tenure, reduce
their workload to one-half for a speciﬁed period, and receive more than onehalf of their full-time salary for that period. The institution may also provide
additional beneﬁts on full retirement at the end of that period. Neither the
beneﬁts paid during the period of phased retirement nor the beneﬁts provided at full retirement will fail to qualify for the safe harbor because of the
fact that the faculty member is no longer tenured when those beneﬁts are
provided.
Voluntary retirement. The safe harbor is available only for supplemental
beneﬁts payable on voluntary retirement. The statute does not elaborate on
the term ‘‘voluntary,’’ nor does the Conference Report. Presumably, the
body of law addressing the meaning of ‘‘voluntary’’ for other purposes of
the ADEA will apply in this area as well.21 Thus, for example, a generous
retirement incentive plan cannot be challenged as forcing involuntary retirement merely because its attractiveness induces employees to retire. Also,
the employee bears the burden of proof that his or her retirement under
a retirement incentive plan was involuntary. Among the relevant factors on
voluntariness are whether:
•
•
•
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the employee had suﬃcient time to consider his or her options;
accurate and complete information was provided about the beneﬁts available under the early retirement incentive plan; and
there have been threats, intimidation and/or coercion.

Given the protections of the unlimited tenure relationship, it is unlikely
that a tenured faculty member could successfully challenge the voluntariness of his or her retirement, absent unusual circumstances.
No age-based reduction or cessation of other beneﬁts. The safe harbor applies to
voluntary retirement incentive beneﬁts oﬀered by an institution only if the
institution does not, at the same time, implement any age-based reduction
or cessation of other, existing beneﬁts (except as otherwise permitted by the
ADEA). In other words, a safe harbor plan cannot reward those who choose
to retire and punish those who do not choose to retire. For example, a fac-
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ulty retirement incentive plan could not both provide additional beneﬁts for
retirement before age 70 and, for those choosing to remain employed after
age 70, take away health coverage, a parking space, or some other beneﬁt
or perquisite that is generally available to tenured faculty members.
However, age-based changes in beneﬁts that are permitted by other provisions of the ADEA would not prevent the safe harbor from applying. For
example, age-based reductions in beneﬁts are permitted when justiﬁed by
increased employer cost. In addition, postretirement health coverage can be
(and typically is) eliminated or scaled back substantially upon the retiree’s
eligibility for Medicare. Because these reductions are permissible under
the ADEA, they do not defeat the safe harbor. Also, employers frequently
change postretirement beneﬁts from time to time, often reducing or eliminating post-retirement health coverage, for example. This, too, would not
prevent the safe harbor from applying, where the change applied to all faculty members or to a non-age-based class of faculty members.
Beneﬁts in addition to preexisting retirement or severance beneﬁts. The supplemental beneﬁts described in the safe harbor must be in addition to any retirement or severance beneﬁts that have been oﬀered generally to tenured
faculty, independent of any early retirement or exit-incentive plan, within
the preceding 365 days. This provision is designed to prevent an institution
that currently oﬀers postretirement (or postseverance) lifetime health coverage, or other beneﬁts, to tenured faculty members from instituting a safe
harbor retirement incentive plan and oﬀering the lifetime health coverage
or other beneﬁts only to faculty members retiring under that safe harbor
plan. In other words, the safe harbor does not permit an employer to take
existing postretirement (or postseverance) beneﬁts that are available generally to tenured faculty, without any reduction or cessation based on increased age, and transform them into age-based beneﬁts under a retirement
incentive plan described in the safe harbor.
However, in recognition of the fact that employers frequently change, replace, or terminate employee beneﬁts, this restriction is limited to preexisting beneﬁts that were in eﬀect during the preceding 365 days. Thus, for example, an employer that ceased providing postretirement health coverage
to those retiring on or after January 1, 2000, could, on or after January 1,
2001, institute a safe harbor retirement incentive plan that includes postretirement health coverage as a beneﬁt only for those who choose to retire
under the safe harbor plan. For purposes of this 365-day rule, while the language is not entirely clear, it appears that beneﬁts that continue to be provided to those who are already retired are not taken into account. A beneﬁt
would presumably cease to ‘‘have been oﬀered generally’’ to tenured faculty
when those who retire cease to be eligible for it, and not when the beneﬁt
ceases to be available to those already retired. For instance, if the institution
in the preceding example stopped oﬀering postretirement health coverage
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Table 1. Hypothetical Safe-Harbor Incentive Retirement Program
Retirement at age

Lump sum beneﬁt as percent
of ﬁnal annual salary

65
66
67
68
69
70 or older

200
160
120
80
40
0

Source: Author’s calculations.

on January 1, 2000, the fact that those who retired before that date continue
to receive postretirement health coverage for many years to come should
not prevent the institution from oﬀering retiree health coverage under a
safe harbor retirement incentive plan, beginning January 1, 2001.
In addition, a safe harbor plan can provide a beneﬁt previously oﬀered
under a prior early retirement or exit-incentive plan, even if oﬀered within
the preceding 365 days. This would, for example, permit an institution to replace an existing early retirement incentive plan with a new plan described
in the safe harbor, without waiting 365 days. Similarly, an institution that has
been negotiating retirement or exit incentives with faculty members on a
case-by-case basis could adopt a safe harbor plan within 365 days thereafter
and include the same beneﬁts under that plan.
‘‘One bite at the apple’’ without regard to increased age. The ﬁnal condition of
the safe harbor is often referred to as the one-bite-at-the-apple or the onebite rule. It is designed to ensure that an otherwise eligible employee is not
precluded (by having attained too high an age) from having at least one
reasonable opportunity to retire and receive the maximum beneﬁt oﬀered
by the safe harbor plan. That opportunity must include at least 180 days to
make the election to retire, and at least 180 days after the election to plan
for retirement. Since institutions need time to ﬁll positions, change teaching assignments for other faculty members, or change curricula, the second
180-day requirement should generally be in the interest of both the professor and the institution.
The one-bite-at-the-apple condition will generally apply in two circumstances. First, when a safe harbor retirement incentive plan is established,
those who are otherwise eligible for the plan, but are too old to receive its
maximum beneﬁt, must be given at least 180 days in which they may elect
to retire under the plan and receive that maximum beneﬁt. Assume, for example, a safe harbor incentive plan that provides a lump-sum cash beneﬁt
determined under Table 1.

6140 Clark / TO RETIRE OR NOT / sheet 56 of 186
Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

48

David L. Raish

A tenured faculty member who was age 71 when the plan was established
must be oﬀered a 180-day opportunity to elect to retire and receive a lump
sum beneﬁt equal to 200 percent of ﬁnal annual salary. (A faculty member
who does not elect to retire during that time period would not have any
future right to any beneﬁt under the plan.) The faculty member must also be
given a period of at least 180 days after the election to plan for retirement.
Similarly, a faculty member who was age 67 when the above plan was established would also be entitled to a 180-day period during which he or she
could elect to retire and receive the maximum 200 percent beneﬁt (followed by another 180 days to plan for retirement). If the 67-year-old faculty
member did not elect during the applicable 180-day period to retire, he or
she would be entitled only to those lower beneﬁts available thereafter (for
example, a 40 percent beneﬁt if the faculty member ultimately retired at
age 69).
The second circumstance in which the one-bite rule will apply is where
a faculty member is not yet eligible for the plan, for a reason other than
age, at the time the plan is established, and subsequently becomes eligible
at an age when the maximum beneﬁt is not normally available. That faculty
member, too, must be given the 180-day opportunity to elect to retire and
receive the maximum beneﬁt (and another 180 days to plan for retirement,
after that election). For example, if a safe harbor retirement incentive plan,
providing beneﬁts under the table above, requires ﬁfteen years of continuous service before a faculty member becomes eligible for the plan, a faculty
member whose continuous service began at age 56, and who completed the
ﬁfteen-year service requirement at age 71, would be entitled to elect at that
time to retire and receive 200 percent of pay as a lump sum beneﬁt. The
same would be true if the faculty member completed the ﬁfteen years of
continuous service at age 66, 67, 68, or 69.
The maximum beneﬁt available under the one-bite rule. The one-bite opportunity must apply to ‘‘the maximum beneﬁt that could then be elected by
a younger but otherwise similarly situated employee.’’ This means, for example, that if, on completion of the ﬁfteen-year service requirement in the
preceding example, the safe harbor plan was no longer in eﬀect (such that
no beneﬁt could then be elected by a younger employee), the faculty member completing the ﬁfteen-year service requirement would also be entitled
to no beneﬁt. Similarly, if the plan had been modiﬁed between the time it
was established and the time the faculty member completed ﬁfteen years
of continuous service, whether to reduce or increase beneﬁts, the faculty
member would be entitled to the maximum beneﬁt available at that time as
reduced or increased.
The maximum beneﬁt that must be made available is the beneﬁt that
is available to a ‘‘younger but otherwise similarly situated employee.’’ This
means that, while the older faculty member beneﬁting from the one-bite
condition is assumed to be of the age at which the maximum beneﬁt is avail-
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able, all other relevant facts are those actually in existence with respect to
the faculty member. For example, if the beneﬁt is a percentage of ﬁnal pay,
the ﬁnal pay is the faculty member’s actual ﬁnal pay, not the ﬁnal pay that he
or she would have had at a younger age, or that some other, younger faculty
member may have. If the schedule of beneﬁts diﬀers among the schools or
faculties at the university, the maximum beneﬁt would be determined under
the schedule that applies to the faculty member’s own school or faculty.
According to the statute and the Conference Report, it does not appear
relevant that a maximum beneﬁt could grow to a larger amount if the faculty
member were permitted to elect to retire after the initial 180-day election
period, due to an increase in salary, years of service, or some other factor
that may, under a given safe harbor plan, aﬀect the amount of the beneﬁts
provided. It appears that the beneﬁts provided under the one-bite condition
need not take any such possible increases into account, and that no second
bite needs to be made available. For example, if a plan is established oﬀering the beneﬁts described in the table above, and a 71-year-old professor is
given six months to elect to retire and receive a beneﬁt equal to 200 percent
of ﬁnal annual salary, it appears that the beneﬁt need only take into account
his or her ﬁnal salary at the time of the election. If the professor declines to
retire at that time and earns a higher salary the following year, it does not
appear that another election needs to be oﬀered with the increased beneﬁt.
Ascertaining the maximum beneﬁt. In a plan that oﬀers only a lump sum beneﬁt, in the form of a dollar amount or percentage of pay, as in the examples
above, it is easy to determine the maximum beneﬁt available to a younger
but similarly situated faculty member. However, some retirement incentive
plans provide several beneﬁts, and may pay or provide them over a period
of years. For example, a bridge beneﬁt might be paid monthly from the time
of retirement until age 65 (or until age 70), allowing a faculty member to
postpone starting his or her regular retirement beneﬁts until that time, so
that they can grow to a higher amount. The safe harbor plan might also oﬀer
health coverage from retirement until age 65, or for the faculty member’s
lifetime. Other beneﬁts might include on-campus parking, oﬃce, laboratory or library space, secretarial assistance, and other opportunities to participate in campus life in various ways. The Conference Report provides:
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If more than one beneﬁt is oﬀered, or noncash beneﬁts are provided, or beneﬁts are
provided over a period of time, the employee will be assumed to retire at the age
which, under the applicable formula or formulas, results in beneﬁts with the largest
combined present value.

In most cases, the age at which this present value is the greatest will be
readily apparent. For example, if a safe harbor retirement plan provides the
beneﬁts described above to individuals retiring between ages 65 and 70, the
monthly bridge beneﬁt is 50 percent of ﬁnal monthly pay, that beneﬁt is payable until age 70, and the retiree health coverage is available for the faculty
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member’s lifetime, it is clear that the maximum beneﬁts would be available
to someone electing to retire at age 65. Those maximum beneﬁts would be
ﬁve years of monthly bridge beneﬁts plus lifetime medical coverage and perquisites. A 66-year-old or 68-year-old retiree would receive fewer monthly
bridge beneﬁts and other lifetime beneﬁts over a shorter lifetime. Accordingly, a 71-year-old faculty member to whom the one-bite condition applies
would be entitled to ﬁve years of monthly bridge beneﬁts, at 50 percent
of his or her actual ﬁnal monthly rate of pay, together with lifetime retiree
medical coverage and other perquisites.While the Conference Report states
that the faculty member will be assumed to retire at the age that results in
beneﬁts with the largest combined present value, the Conference Report
does not suggest that the beneﬁts actually received by the faculty member
must have a present value at least equal to that amount. For example, the
71-year-old faculty member exercising his or her right under the one-bite
condition will have a shorter life expectancy, so the lifetime medical coverage and other perquisites provided will have a smaller present value. Presumably, no additional beneﬁt must be paid to make up for this diﬀerence
in present value, although the statute and legislative history are not entirely
clear on this point.
The 180-day requirements. Given the two 180-day periods required, as a
minimum, to satisfy the one-bite condition, the oﬀer of voluntary retirement
incentives would need to be made at least 360 days prior to the intended retirement date. This would allow a tenured faculty member to wait until the
last day of the 180-day election period before making his or her election,
and still have another 180 days after the election to plan for retirement. For
example, if retirements generally occur on June 30, a safe harbor plan could
provide for an election to be made between July 1 and December 31 of one
year to retire on June 30 of the next year. On the other hand, the Conference
Report does make clear that a faculty member may waive the second 180day period. For example, if a faculty member elected on July 1 to retire on
September 1 of the same year, and if the institution were agreeable to that
timetable, the safe harbor plan would still satisfy the one-bite condition.
In the case of a phased retirement plan under which a faculty member
elects a reduced workload, but does not fully retire for a stated period of
years, it does not seem necessary to allow 180 days between the time of the
faculty member’s election and the time the reduced workload begins, as
long as there are at least 180 days between that election and the date of full
retirement. However, the Conference Report does not speciﬁcally address
this point, and the statute is not entirely clear.
Examples of safe harbor plans. The Conference Report oﬀers some examples
of faculty retirement incentive beneﬁts that would fall within the safe harbor. The ﬁrst involves a monthly bridge beneﬁt available to tenured faculty
members who voluntarily retire between ages 65 and 70. In the example,
the bridge beneﬁt equals 50 percent of the faculty member’s ﬁnal monthly
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salary, and is paid from retirement until age 70.The Conference Report goes
on to explain that the beneﬁt could be made available between other ages,
such as 60 and 65, or 62 and 69, could involve a percentage of salary diﬀerent from 50 percent, and could even include a varying percentage of salary
based, for example, on service, rank, the school or department in which the
faculty member teaches, or other factors. The Conference Report clariﬁes
that the beneﬁt could also be subject to other conditions, such as a minimum service requirement for eligibility, or limitation of the plan to one or
more schools, departments, or other classiﬁcations of tenured faculty.
There is, of course, no requirement that the beneﬁt be based on the retiree’s actual salary. It could instead be based on an average salary for professors of a given rank, or in a speciﬁc discipline, or institutionwide, or at
a group of institutions. Alternatively, the beneﬁt could be a ﬁxed dollar
amount instead of a percentage of salary, or it could be based on a formula
altogether unrelated to salary.
Another example provided by the Conference Report involves a plan that
provides lump sum retirement incentive payments that are reduced based
on age at retirement, and eliminated at a speciﬁed upper age, such as age 65
or 70. As in the case of a monthly bridge beneﬁt, an institution has considerable leeway in structuring its plan. Variables include the age or ages at which
the lump sum beneﬁt is available, the amount of the beneﬁt, the extent to
which it is reduced based on age, the age at which it ceases to be available,
and the eligibility conditions that apply, including a minimum service requirement or limitation of the plan to one or more schools, departments
or other classiﬁcations of tenured faculty. Institutions that prefer a monthly
bridge beneﬁt for a period of years may, in eﬀect, be forced to oﬀer a single
lump sum beneﬁt instead, because the monthly bridge beneﬁt may result in
up-front taxation on the full present value of the payments to be made, as
discussed below.
The Conference Report also discusses a ‘‘voluntary phased, planned or
similar retirement program’’ that oﬀers subsidized pay or beneﬁts for parttime work or decreased duties. Even if the amount of the subsidy or the
duration of the part-time work or decreased duties, or both, is reduced or
eliminated based on age, these programs, when properly structured, also
fall within the safe harbor. For example, a phased retirement program might
allow a tenured faculty member to teach a one-half course load for a period
of one, two, or three years, as elected by the faculty member, with subsidized
pay determined on the basis of Table 2, provided the faculty member gives
up tenure at the start of the phased retirement period and agrees to retire
altogether at the end of the period.
Presumably, the phased retirement opportunity could be eliminated at a
stated age, such as age 70 in the above example, despite the fact that the
example in the Conference Report does not include that plan feature.
The Conference Report does not give examples speciﬁcally addressing
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Table 2. Hypothetical Safe-Harbor Phased Retirement Program.
Age when phased
retirement commences

Percent of full-time salary paid
throughout phased retirement period

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70 or older

90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Source: Author’s calculations.

the provision of various noncash beneﬁts that are common to faculty retirement incentive plans, such as health or life insurance coverage, and various
perquisites that allow a faculty member to remain part of the campus community, such as a parking space, laboratory or oﬃce space, secretarial assistance, committee memberships, access to sports, eating or other facilities,
and the like. However, the statute is drafted broadly enough to include these
and other beneﬁts, and there is no suggestion in the Conference Report of
any limitation on the nature of the beneﬁts oﬀered. Of course, any safe harbor plan, regardless of the amount or nature of the beneﬁts provided, must
satisfy all the conditions of the safe harbor that are discussed above.
Application of the safe harbor to plans that predated it. A number of colleges and
universities implemented age-based faculty retirement incentive plans prior
to the enactment of the Higher Education Amendments of 1998. These institutions have relied principally on the VERIP exception discussed above,
which provides that voluntary early retirement incentive plans do not violate
the ADEA if those plans are otherwise consistent with the relevant purpose
or purposes of the ADEA.
These institutions will now need to examine their existing plans to see
if they satisfy all of the conditions of the safe harbor. If an existing plan
fails to comply in some respect with the safe harbor, it does not necessarily
mean that the plan violates the ADEA. The Higher Education Amendments
of 1998 provide that the enactment of the safe harbor does not aﬀect the
application of the ADEA with respect to any plan that is not described in
the safe harbor.22 An institution may still have compelling arguments that
the VERIP exception applies to such a plan, notwithstanding any age-based
reduction or cessation of beneﬁts. However, the institution may be well
advised to replace that existing plan with one that satisﬁes the conditions
of the safe harbor, in order to achieve greater protection against ADEA
claims.

6140 Clark / TO RETIRE OR NOT / sheet 61 of 186

Age-Based Incentives for Tenured Faculty Members

53

If a preexisting plan satisﬁes all of the conditions of the safe harbor, it
is not protected by the safe harbor as to any cause of action that may have
arisen under the ADEA prior to the date of enactment (October 7, 1998).23
Enactment of the safe harbor does not aﬀect the application of the ADEA to
any plan described in the safe harbor, for any period prior to enactment.24
However, strong arguments can be made that such a plan falls within the
VERIP exemption and, therefore, did not violate the ADEA. Going forward,
it appears that the plan may continue unchanged and beneﬁt from the protection of the safe harbor.
It might be possible to construct an argument that the safe harbor requires the ‘‘one-bite’’ condition to be satisﬁed after enactment of the safe
harbor provisions. For that reason, an institution may, out of caution, want
to reintroduce its faculty retirement incentive plan and oﬀer a new 180-day
period to elect the maximum beneﬁt. While this may result in additional
costs, it also has the advantage of providing a new impetus for retirement by
those older faculty who earlier declined to retire. In any event, it is unlikely
that any plan in existence before the 1998 legislation met all of the detailed
conditions of the safe harbor.
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ERISA Issues to Consider
For many colleges and universities, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), may signiﬁcantly limit the nature of
the beneﬁts that can be provided under a faculty retirement incentive plan,
or the faculty members who may be made eligible for those beneﬁts, or both.
Exemption for state institutions and church-aﬃliated colleges or universities.
ERISA does not apply to beneﬁt plans of state or local governments or their
agencies or instrumentalities.25 Therefore, state colleges and universities,
as well as community colleges, are not subject to ERISA. Religiously aﬃliated colleges or universities are also generally exempt from ERISA, provided that they are controlled by a church (or by a convention or association
of churches) or share common religious bonds and convictions with that
church (or convention or association).26 Accordingly, these colleges and universities need not be concerned with the ERISA constraints discussed below.
However, these institutions do need to be mindful of state statutes prohibiting age discrimination, since they cannot rely on the defense that ERISA
preempts such a statute with respect to a retirement incentive plan subject
to ERISA.27
Plans that are subject to ERISA. Unless they fall within ERISA’s exemptions
for governmental and church-aﬃliated institutions, discussed above, colleges and universities are subject to ERISA with respect to their pension and
welfare beneﬁt plans. Faculty retirement incentive plans will presumably
fall within the ERISA deﬁnition of a ‘‘welfare beneﬁt plan’’ 28 to the extent
they provide such beneﬁts as health coverage, disability beneﬁts, or death
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beneﬁts. Since ERISA contains few content requirements for welfare beneﬁt plans, it is unlikely to aﬀect the design of a faculty retirement incentive
plan with respect to welfare beneﬁts.
Of much greater concern are the ERISA rules applicable to ‘‘pension
plans.’’ ERISA deﬁnes a pension plan to include:
any plan, fund, or program established or maintained by an employer . . . to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan,
fund, or program—
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the
method of calculating the beneﬁts under the plan or the method of distributing
beneﬁts from the plan.29

Faculty retirement incentive plans that oﬀer cash beneﬁts after termination of employment, such as bridge beneﬁts or lump sum payments on
retirement, as described in examples above, would generally fall within
ERISA’s deﬁnition of a pension plan. These plans, if age based, would generally fail to satisfy at least ﬁve of ERISA’s requirements for pension plans.
First, the minimum age for participation is normally 60, 62, or 65, well in excess of ERISA’s age 21 or 26 limit.30 Second, beneﬁts do not accrue and vest
as generally required.31 Instead, they get smaller the later one retires. Third,
ERISA speciﬁcally prohibits the reduction of contributions or beneﬁt accruals based on increased age.32 Fourth, retirement incentives are not typically
oﬀered in a joint and survivor annuity form providing lifetime income to the
surviving spouse.33 Fifth, the plans typically are not funded through a trust
or other vehicle that protects the assets from creditors of the employers.34
Instead, beneﬁts typically are paid from the institution’s general assets.
Exception for top hat plans. ERISA does exempt from these and other pension plan requirements a ‘‘top hat’’ plan—that is, a plan ‘‘which is unfunded
and is maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing
deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated employees.’’ 35 There are no regulations providing guidance on the
meaning of ‘‘select group,’’ ‘‘management,’’ or ‘‘highly compensated employees.’’ In a nonbinding advisory opinion, the Department of Labor has stated
that the top hat provisions should be interpreted in light of Congress’s intent to limit the provisions to individuals who, by virtue of their position or
compensation level, have the ability to aﬀect or substantially inﬂuence the
design and operation of the plan.36
It is doubtful that all faculty members at any college or university constitute a select group of management or highly compensated employees. However, if the retirement incentive plan is limited to a narrowly deﬁned eligible
group, such as tenured, full-time professors over age 60 with at least ﬁf-
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teen years of service, the salary levels may be high enough at a given institution, and the number of eligible individuals low enough, that the group will
qualify for the top hat exemption. The argument that tenured faculty members constitute management, if not highly compensated, employees would
be enhanced if the eligible tenured faculty members had some voting power
or other inﬂuence as a group over the design of the retirement incentive
program and other beneﬁts. As a practical matter, however, to satisfy the top
hat exception some institutions may need to limit their faculty retirement
incentive plans to more select groups of higher paid faculty members, such
as faculty members at the business, law or medical school, or those whose
annual pay exceeds a stated amount.
Phased retirement programs. If a phased retirement program provides beneﬁts only while the individual continues to work, and not after termination
of employment, it is unlikely to be a pension plan under ERISA.37 Thus, the
troublesome ERISA requirements for pension plans would not apply. However, a phased retirement program that falls outside of ERISA’s deﬁnition
of a pension plan would need to be designed with any applicable state age
discrimination laws in mind, since the ERISA preemption argument would
not be available unless the program constituted a welfare beneﬁt plan under
ERISA Section 3(1).38
Window plans. Window plans discussed above may also be exempt from
ERISA, at least if they provide only for a single lump sum cash payment
and no welfare beneﬁts described in ERISA Section 3(1), because such an
arrangement may not constitute a plan under ERISA.
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, in the context of severance payments,
the Supreme Court held that no ERISA plan existed, stating that ‘‘the theoretical possibility of a one-time obligation in the future simply creates no
need for an ongoing administrative program for processing claims and paying beneﬁts.’’ 39 Subsequently, lower courts have examined potential ERISA
plans to determine if they require an ongoing administrative scheme.40 Factors considered in the determination of whether an ongoing administrative
scheme is implicated include the type of payment (one-time lump sum or
continuous, periodic payments), the duration of the employer’s obligation,
the trigger for payments (a one-time event or termination in general), and
the necessity of case-by-case eligibility determinations.41
If a window plan does not constitute either a pension or welfare beneﬁt
plan under ERISA, the ERISA preemption argument would again be unavailable with respect to any applicable state age discrimination laws. Thus,
it is generally inadvisable for a window plan to have an upper age limit or
to reduce beneﬁts based on increased age. Fortunately, such age-based features are not necessary to provide the incentive to retire; the incentive comes
from the closing of the window at the allotted time.
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Federal Income Tax Issues to Consider
Under the Internal Revenue Code, an individual who has a right to deferred
compensation from a tax-exempt or governmental employer is taxed on the
value of that right at the time the right ceases to be subject to a ‘‘substantial risk of forfeiture,’’ even if the individual does not (or could not) receive
the deferred compensation at that time.42 Unlike ERISA, this Code provision applies to deferred compensation payments by both state and private
colleges and universities, including most religiously aﬃliated institutions.43
The ﬁrst question under the Code is whether a faculty retirement incentive plan is providing deferred compensation. In general, it seems likely that
the Internal Revenue Service would take the position that beneﬁt payments
promised under a faculty retirement incentive plan, whether a lump sum
at retirement, periodic bridge payments for a speciﬁed period, or lifetime
payments would constitute deferred compensation.44 On the other hand, if
retirement before a stated age is required in order to receive the retirement
incentive beneﬁts, a strong argument can be made that the faculty member faces a substantial risk of forfeiting those beneﬁts until the day that he
or she retires (before reaching the stated age) and becomes entitled to the
beneﬁts.45 Similarly, with respect to subsidized payments made during parttime employment as part of a phased retirement plan, since those payments
would normally be conditioned on continued part-time employment, they
would be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture until actually paid.
Once a faculty member is fully retired, any remaining payments to which
he or she is thereafter entitled will not normally be subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture, unless the faculty member is obligated to provide some
continuing, substantial services in exchange for those payments—e.g., as a
consultant.46 Thus, the faculty member is subject to tax on the full present
value of those payments at the time of retirement. For this reason, most
colleges and universities have designed their faculty retirement incentive
plans to provide beneﬁt payments in a single lump sum. However, this is
not compelled by the Code. An institution could make periodic payments
over a ﬁxed period, or over the faculty member’s lifetime. As a practical
matter, the ﬁrst payment should be large enough to cover the taxes on the
present value of all payments, or the institution should be prepared to make
a loan to the faculty member to cover those taxes and to obtain repayment of
that loan through monthly deductions from the subsequent periodic beneﬁt payments. In either instance, the tax treatment of the actual beneﬁt payments is quite complicated. A portion of each periodic payment is treated
as a tax-free recovery of the present value already taxed, while the balance
of the payment is subject to ordinary income tax. To avoid these tax (and associated reporting) complexities, institutions have normally opted for lump
sum retirement incentive payments.
Legislation was proposed and almost enacted in 1992 exempting certain
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faculty retirement incentive plans from the adverse tax treatment of deferred compensation. Perhaps the higher education community will again
seek such legislation.
In the case of a window plan, under which all employees over a minimum
age may elect to retire within a speciﬁed period of months and receive additional beneﬁts, those beneﬁts would similarly be subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture in the normal case. The risk of forfeiture arises because the
beneﬁts would normally be conditioned on retirement on the date speciﬁed
in the window election (and on continued employment until that date). If
the payments were to be made over a period of time, or over the faculty
member’s lifetime, an argument can be made that they do not in this context constitute deferred compensation. In its regulations deﬁning deferred
compensation under a similarly drafted statute relating to FICA taxes, the
Internal Revenue Service takes the position that beneﬁts paid under window plans, or certain similar arrangements, should be treated as severance
payments instead of deferred compensation.47 Arguably, the same approach
should be taken for income tax purposes, with the result that periodic payments under a window plan would not be taxed until received.
A U.S. district court in 1999 held that one-time early retirement incentive
payments to tenured faculty members in exchange for their release of tenure
rights are not ‘‘wages’’ for purposes of FICA taxes.48 The court concluded
that the early retirement payments to tenured faculty members were for the
purchase of their tenure rights, which constitute property interests. According to the court, the payments used to purchase the property interests were
not ‘‘wages’’ or ‘‘remuneration for services’’ and so were not subject to FICA
taxes. Arguably, the court’s rationale also extends to early retirement payments made over a period of time in exchange for tenure rights. The same
rationale would support the argument that such payments are not ‘‘deferred
compensation’’ for federal income tax purposes. However, the court’s opinion is ﬂatly contrary to the position taken by the Internal Revenue Service,49
and it is not clear whether other courts will agree.
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State Age Discrimination Laws
The ADEA does not preempt state age discrimination laws, to the extent
they oﬀer broader protection than the ADEA.50 Thus, the safe harbor for
certain age-based faculty retirement incentive plans has no eﬀect on the
applicability of state age discrimination laws. With respect to faculty retirement incentive plans (including top hat plans) that constitute employee
beneﬁt plans as deﬁned in ERISA, ERISA should preempt any state age
discrimination law to the extent such state law prohibits conduct which is
lawful under the ADEA.51 However, as discussed above, some faculty retirement incentive plans are not subject to ERISA and, therefore, do not beneﬁt
from the ERISA preemption of state law. Plans not covered by ERISA in-
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clude, as discussed above, plans of state colleges and universities and community colleges, plans of certain religiously aﬃliated colleges and universities, phased retirement programs of all institutions, where such programs
provide no ERISA-covered beneﬁts, and window plans providing only lump
sum cash payments. Accordingly, institutions considering such plans will
need to take into account any state age discrimination laws that apply to the
institutions.

Summary of Available Options
The variety of possible faculty retirement incentive beneﬁts can be divided
into three categories: window plans, ongoing retirement incentive plans
that provide beneﬁts on full retirement, and phased retirement plans that
oﬀer beneﬁts during a phase-down of the work load for a speciﬁed period,
followed by full retirement.
A faculty retirement incentive plan may, of course, include elements of
two or even all three of these categories—for example, an enhanced beneﬁt at the outset, during a window period, followed by the option to take
phased retirement or full retirement with diﬀering beneﬁts. Of course, institutions may oﬀer retirement incentives to faculty members on an individually negotiated basis, without any formalized plan at all. Such arrangements,
however, are outside the scope of this chapter.
Window plans. As discussed above, a window plan oﬀers faculty members
a set period of months in which they can elect to retire with enhanced retirement beneﬁts. For example, a window plan might give faculty the opportunity to elect between September 1 and December 31 of a given year to
retire the following June 30 and receive a lump sum payment or periodic
payments with or without postretirement health coverage or other enhancements. While the opportunity is typically limited to faculty members over a
minimum retirement age, such as 60 or 62, window plans do not normally
have a maximum age. An age cap is generally not necessary to provide the
incentive to retire, since the end of the window (December 31 in the above
example) provides that incentive.
From a legal standpoint, window plans raise the fewest concerns under
the statutes discussed above. With no upper age limit and no reduction of
beneﬁts based on increased age, and assuming retirement is voluntary, such
a plan does not discriminate on the basis of age and, therefore, does not
need to fall within the new safe harbor, or any other speciﬁc exemption,
in order to comply with the ADEA. For these same reasons, state age discrimination laws should not be of concern. For institutions subject to ERISA,
the retirement incentive beneﬁts are unlikely to constitute a separate ERISA
plan, at least where beneﬁts are paid in a single lump sum payment, because
the plan is temporary and requires no ongoing administration. Finally, the
adverse tax treatment of deferred compensation is arguably avoided on the
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grounds that the payments are in the nature of severance pay and not deferred compensation.
On the other hand, window plans are unattractive to many institutions,
given the perceived unfairness of oﬀering substantial beneﬁts only to those
few faculty members who are eligible—and prepared—to retire during a
limited period of time. Window plans also have little eﬀectiveness if oﬀered
more than once, or if other circumstances exist that may cause faculty members to believe they can simply wait for the next window to retire.
Other plans providing beneﬁts on full retirement. Plans in this category are normally more ongoing in nature although subject, of course, to the institution’s
ability to modify or terminate them. These plans typically oﬀer retirement
incentive payments, as a single lump sum or periodic payments, with or
without postretirement health coverage or other enhancements, on full retirement from the institution. In order to provide some incentive to faculty
members to retire, and to limit the additional retirement beneﬁts to earlier
retirement when the faculty member most needs them, these ongoing plans
have not only a minimum retirement age for eligibility but also a maximum
age. They also typically include a reduction in beneﬁt based on increasing
age. Thus, institutions need to structure these plans to avoid age discrimination claims by older faculty. Unless institutions are prepared to take the
risk of relying on the uncertain scope of the ADEA’s VERIP exception, these
plans should be designed to satisfy the conditions of the 1998 safe harbor.
This means assuring that:
•
•
•
•
•

•
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•

The institution falls within the deﬁnition of ‘‘institution of higher education’’ in the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended.
The plan is limited to faculty members (or other employees) who are
under a contract of unlimited tenure, or a similar arrangement providing
for unlimited tenure.
The beneﬁts provided are ‘‘supplemental’’ to other beneﬁts existing at
the time the plan is implemented.
With respect to tenured faculty members who do not choose to retire, the
institution does not take away other, existing beneﬁts, or reduce existing
beneﬁts, as a result of increased age.
The plan does not make available, solely to those retiring under the plan,
beneﬁts that were generally available to tenured faculty members retiring
within the preceding 365 days (except for beneﬁts under another early
retirement or exit incentive plan).
When the plan is established, every faculty member who would be eligible for the maximum beneﬁt except for attainment of too high an age
is given a 180-day opportunity to elect retirement and receive that maximum beneﬁt, and another 180 days to plan for retirement.
Any faculty member who, at the time the plan was established, did not
meet all eligibility criteria other than age (such as a required number of
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years of service) and later satisﬁes those criteria will have a 180-day opportunity to receive the maximum beneﬁt then available to a younger,
but otherwise similarly situated, employee.
Ongoing retirement incentive plans of this nature should be structured
with consideration of the employee’s tax consequences. Unless they pay the
cash incentive beneﬁt (if any) in a single lump sum payment, the institution
will probably want to frontload the payments suﬃciently to cover the upfront tax liability on the present value of all periodic payments, or loan a
similar amount to the employee to pay that tax liability, with repayment to
be made through payroll deduction from the remaining payments.
Institutions subject to ERISA—that is, colleges and universities other than
state institutions and certain religiously aﬃliated institutions—must limit
this second category of plans to a select group of management or highly
compensated employees within the meaning of ERISA’s top hat exemption.
This top hat exemption presently is unclear in scope, given the absence of
guidance from the Department of Labor.
In the case of a state college or university, community college, or religiously aﬃliated college or university that is exempt from ERISA, the institution will need to consider any applicable state age discrimination laws.
This is unlikely to be true of an institution subject to ERISA, assuming the
retirement incentive plan constitutes an ERISA pension plan, because of
ERISA’s preemption of state law aﬀecting such beneﬁt plans. Nevertheless,
this does not appear to have been tested yet in the courts in the context of
early retirement incentive plans.
Phased retirement plans. This third category of plans provides enhanced
salary or beneﬁts, or both, prior to full retirement during a period of years
(usually three years or less) during which a faculty member’s workload gradually decreases. Typically, the faculty member gives up tenure at the beginning of the phase-down period, and agrees to retire fully at the end of the
period, although these elements are not always required. The phase-down
may be in stages, such as 75 percent, 50 percent, and 25 percent workloads
over a three-year period, or it may involve a simple cutback to a 50 percent
(or other percentage) workload throughout the phased retirement period.
Phased retirement plans might have an upper age limit, or they might reduce the enhanced salary or beneﬁts based on increased age, or both. However, some institutions oﬀer the phased retirement option with the same
enhanced salary or beneﬁts to all tenured faculty over a minimum age, such
as 55 or 60.
If the phased retirement plan has an upper age limit on eligibility, or reduces beneﬁts based on age in some respect, an institution is generally welladvised to design the plan to fall within the safe harbor discussed above.
This means, as a practical matter, that the following must be true:
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The institution falls within the deﬁnition of institution of higher education in the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended.
The plan is limited to faculty members (or other employees) who are
under a contract of unlimited tenure, or a similar arrangement providing
for unlimited tenure.
The salary subsidy paid (and any other extra beneﬁts provided by the
plan) during the phase-down period are in addition to salary amounts
(and beneﬁts) generally available to part-time faculty with the same workload.
The phased retirement plan does not involve any age-based reduction or
cessation of beneﬁts other than the salary subsidy (and any other extra
beneﬁts provided by the plan), except as otherwise permitted by the
ADEA.
The salary subsidy (and any other extra beneﬁts provided by the plan)
generally have not been available to part-time tenured faculty members,
with similar workloads, during the preceding 365 days, except under
another early retirement or exit-incentive plan.
Any faculty member who is otherwise eligible at the time the plan is established, but is over the highest age at which the maximum phased retirement plan beneﬁts are available, has at least a 180-day opportunity to
elect phased retirement and receive the maximum beneﬁts available to a
similarly situated younger faculty member and another 180 days to plan
for retirement.
Any faculty member who, at the time the plan was established, did not
meet all eligibility criteria other than age (such as a required number of
years of service) and later satisﬁes those criteria, but is then older than
the highest age at which the maximum beneﬁts are generally available,
has a 180-day opportunity to elect phased retirement and receive the
maximum beneﬁts.

If the beneﬁts under a phased retirement plan are provided solely while
the individual continues to work, and not after termination of employment,
such a plan will not generally fall within the meaning of a pension plan under
ERISA. Therefore, such a plan need not be limited to a select group of management or highly compensated employees in order to avoid ERISA’s onerous requirements for pension plans.
On the other hand, the absence of ERISA pension plan status deprives the
institution of the argument that state age discrimination laws are preempted
by ERISA, unless the plan’s age-based beneﬁts are health coverage, disability
beneﬁts, death beneﬁts, or other beneﬁts that fall within the ERISA deﬁnition of a welfare beneﬁt plan.The institution will, therefore, have to consider
the eﬀect of any such law that may apply.
The adverse tax rules for deferred compensation should not be of con-
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cern in a phased retirement plan, so long as the enhanced salary or beneﬁts are conditioned upon continued provision of services during the phasedown period.

Conclusion
Many institutions of higher education—and their faculties—value ongoing
retirement incentive plans. The institutions beneﬁt from more orderly faculty turnover and, in many cases, substantial cost savings.The individual faculty members have the opportunity to retire more comfortably at an earlier
age, if they are inclined to do so.
For an ongoing retirement incentive plan to accomplish these objectives,
it is important that the beneﬁts decrease at higher ages and end at a speciﬁed age. Otherwise, there would be no incentive to retire, and older retirees
may reap a windfall given the growth in their retirement accounts, older retirees are less likely to need an extra beneﬁt to produce a comfortable level
of retirement income.
Until enactment of the ADEA safe harbor in 1998, the legality of agebased retirement incentive plans was uncertain. The safe harbor now aﬀords
them protection. However, the safe harbor includes a number of conditions
that need to be satisﬁed. In addition, other federal and state laws need to
be taken into account. Thus, careful planning is required in designing and
implementing age-based retirement incentive plans for tenured faculty.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ellen V. Benson, an
associate at Ropes & Gray in Boston, Massachusetts, and the helpful comments of Ann H. Franke, Director of Employment Liability Services, United
Educators Insurance Risk Retention Group, Inc., in Chevy Chase, Maryland.
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Notes
1. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, §941, 112 Stat.
1581, 1834–35, adding section 4(m) to the ADEA.
2. See Clark, Kreps, and Ghent (this volume) and the discussion of the research by
Ashenfelter and Card (1998) Clark and Hammond (this volume) for an assessment
of the change in retirement ages since the ending of mandatory retirement.
3. See Keefe (this volume) for discussions of retirement incentive programs and
intangible factors in retirement decisions.
4. See Ehrenberg et al. (this volume) for an examination of the implications of
delayed retirement on Cornell University.
5. Solon v. Gary Community School Corp., 180 F. 3d 844 (7th Cir. 1999); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Crown Point Community School Corp., 1997 WL 54747
(N.D. Ind. 1997). Challenges have been rejected by Auerbach v. Board of Education of
the Harborﬁelds Central School District of Greenlawn, New York, 136 F. 3d 104 (2nd Cir.
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1998), although with dicta suggesting gradual age-based reductions would violate
the ADEA, and by Lyon v. Ohio Education Association, 53 F. 3d 135 (6th Cir. 1995).
6. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, M U.S. M, 2000 WL 14165,* 16 ( January 11,
2000).
7. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, §941(c)(2)–(3).
8. ADEA §4(l)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. §623(l)(1)(A); see Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d
434, 437 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that ADEA section 4(l )(1)(A) precludes the ADEA
claim of a 52-year-old individual asserting that he was denied pension beneﬁts in
violation of the ADEA because he was under age 55).
9. ADEA §4(l)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §623(l)(1)(B).
10. ADEA §4( f )(2)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C. §623( f)(2)(B)(ii).
11. ADEA §2(b), 29 U.S.C. §621(b).
12. 136 Cong. Rec. S13594-01, S13596 (September 24, 1990) (S. 1511 Final Substitute: Statement of Managers) (hereafter ‘‘OWBPA Statement of Managers’’).
13. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Request for Comments, Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 57 Fed. Reg. 10626, 10628 (March 27, 1992).
14. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiﬀ at 21–22, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Crown Point Community School Corp., No. 2893 CV237, 1997 WL 54747 (N.D. Ind.
1997); Brief for Appellants at 12–14, Lyon v. Ohio Education Association, 53 F.3d 135
(6th Cir. 1995).
15. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Crown Point Community School Corp.
16. Auerbach v. Board of Education. In dicta, the court suggested that the VERIP exception would not apply if the beneﬁts were gradually reduced as higher ages were
attained. However, it is unclear why this distinction would be warranted.
17. Higher Education Amendments of 1998.
18. ADEA §4(m), 29 U.S.C. §623(m).
19. H.R. Rep. No. 105-750, pp. 403–7 (1998).
20. See C.F.R. §1625.11(e)(1) (1998) (amplifying the meaning of ‘‘unlimited tenure’’ to some extent).
21. See, e.g., OWBPA Statement of Managers, at S13596; Auerbach v. Board of Education.
22. Higher Education Amendments of 1998.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §§3(32) and 4(b)
(1), 29 U.S.C. §§1002(32) and 1003(b)(1).
26. ERISA §§3(33) and 4(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§1002(33) and 1003(b)(2).
27. ERISA §514(a), 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) (providing that ERISA ‘‘shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee beneﬁt
plan described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b)’’).
28. ERISA §3(1), 29 U.S.C. §1002(1).
29. ERISA §3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §1002(2)(A).
30. ERISA §202(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1052(a)(1).
31. ERISA §203, 29 U.S.C. §1053.
32. ERISA §204(b), 29 U.S.C. §1054(b).
33. ERISA §205(a), 29 U.S.C. §1055(a).
34. ERISA §302, 29 U.S.C. §1082.
35. ERISA §§201(2) and 301(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§1051(2) and 1081(a)(3).
36. Department of Labor Advisory Opinion No. 90-14A.
37. But see Department of Labor Advisory Opinion No. 81-27A.
38. ERISA §514(a), 29 U.S.C. §1144(a).
39. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12 (1987).
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40. See, e.g., Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.3d 1404, 1409 (6th Cir. 1996); Delaye
v. Agripac, Inc., 39 F.3d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1994); Champagne v. Revco D.S. Inc., 997
F.Supp. 220, 221–22 (D.R.I. 1998).
41. Champagne v. Revco D.S. Inc., 997 F. Supp. at 222, quoting Gilmore v. Silgan Plastics Corp., 917 f. Supp. 685, 688 (E.O. No. 1996).
42. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, §457( f).
43. A religiously aﬃliated institution is exempt from Section 457( f) if it is church
or a ‘‘qualiﬁed church-controlled organization’’ within the meaning of Section 3121
(w)(3)(B) of the Code. I.R.C. §457(e)(13). However, a religiously aﬃliated college or
university falls within that exemption only if it is not open to the general public or no
more than 25 percent of its revenues normally consist of tuition or other payments
from the public or of government-source funds. I.R.C. §3121(w)(3)(B).
44. See Treas. Reg. §31.3121(v)(2)-1(b)(3)(i), (deﬁning ‘‘deferral of compensation’’
for purposes of a special timing rule for FICA tax payments in Section 3121(v)(2) of
the Code, which is worded very similarly to Section 457( f)).
45. See Treas. Reg. §1.83–3(c).
46. Ibid.
47. Treas. Reg. §31.3121(v)(2)-1(b)(4)(v).
48. North Dakota State Univ. v. United States, No. A3-98-50, Slip. op. at 18–20 (D.N.D.
Nov. 22, 1999).
49. See IRS Technical Advice Memorandum 9711001.
50. 29 CFR §1625.10(g); Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201,
209–10 (6th Cir. 1990), Bailey v. Container Corp. of America, 594 F. Supp. 629, 632–33
(S.D. Ohio 1984).
51. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103–4 (1983); Devlin v. Transportation
Communications International Union, 173 F. 3d 9y (2nd Cir. 1999).
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